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Australian Evidence on Corporate Governance Attributes and their Association with 
Forward-looking Information in the Annual Report 
 
 Introduction 
In this study we investigate the role played by the corporate governance framework of 
Australian companies in the decision to voluntarily disclose forward-looking information in their 
published financial reports. Forward-looking information in the form of management forecasts has 
been used as a proxy for voluntary disclosure in a number of prior studies (Healy & Palipu, 2001).  
Furthermore, the disclosure of such information may be viewed as one dimension of financial 
reporting quality since a financial report containing forward-looking information is more likely to 
be perceived as being of higher quality (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 
2005; Clarkson, Kao, & Richardson, 1994). In the present study we examine the disclosure of all 
types of forward-looking information, including but not limited to management forecasts, in order 
to provide a broader representation of the type of information disclosed by firms regarding their 
future prospects. We consider whether forward-looking information is provided within all narrative 
sections of the annual report (eg, chairman’s letter, directors’ report, review of operations and 
discussion and analysis), prior to examining how such disclosures relate to the firm’s standard of 
corporate governance.  
There are numerous techniques that a firm may use to distribute corporate information to 
external stakeholders, with earnings forecasts frequently being made under the continuous 
disclosure regime of the Australian Securities Exchange1 (ASX). However, the corporate annual 
report has traditionally been the principal medium for conveying detailed financial and non-
financial information on the firm (Botosan, 1997).  Firms employ the annual report as an important 
                                                 
1
 Following a merger with the Sydney Futures Exchange, the Australian Stock Exchange changed its name in 
December 2006 to ASX Limited, operating under the brand Australian Securities Exchange.  
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avenue of disclosure, given its effectiveness as a marketing tool and a means of conveying a certain 
corporate image or message (Preston, Wright, & Young, 1996).  Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell (1998, 
p. 269) suggest that annual reports “provide organisations with an effective method of managing 
external impressions”, in part because the annual report “possesses a degree of credibility not 
associated with other forms of advertising”. Hence, while we acknowledge that the annual report 
may not be the first avenue of disclosure of forward-looking information, we argue that firms that 
make high quality disclosures will ensure that their report includes such information.  
Prior research indicates that firms with higher standards of corporate governance are more 
disposed to voluntary disclosure of future information (Hossain, Ahmed, & Godfrey, 2005; 
Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005). Hence in this study, we expect 
to identify a positive relationship between certain corporate governance categories (and the overall 
standard of corporate governance) and the disclosure of forward-looking information. 
 This study is motivated by the aim of providing a more detailed examination of the 
relationship between corporate governance and the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking 
information in Australian corporate annual reports. Australia provides an interesting setting in 
which to study such relationships because corporate governance is less regulated than in other 
regimes such as the United States (Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2005). Indeed, at the time 
of the present study, there were no formal requirements or recommendations relating to board 
structure and the use of sub-committees such as the audit committee. Further, while Australian 
listed companies are required to provide a review of operations in the Directors’ Report, the content 
of the report at the time of the study was unregulated and the disclosure of forward-looking 
information was not stipulated (Seah & Tarca, 2007). 
We provide an in-depth representation of corporate governance within the firm by 
considering a range of fifteen governance mechanisms. In addition, we investigate the broader 
category of forward-looking information, rather than the narrower category of earnings forecasts 
(Clarkson, Kao, & Richardson, 1994).    Hence our study contributes to the small but growing body 
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of literature that examines the effect of corporate governance on the quality of financial disclosures 
(Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005).2 Our findings should be of particular interest to corporate regulators 
and policy makers who expect a link between stronger governance and greater corporate 
transparency.  The study should also interest regulators who advocate the provision of forward- 
looking information.  
 Our study focuses on the years 2000 and 2002. The results reveal that the forward-looking 
information disclosed by sample firms tends to be expressed in terms of expecting an upward 
movement in such measures as profit, earnings or income. In the year 2000, disclosing firms 
typically enjoy a higher standard of corporate governance than non-disclosing firms. In that year, 
the corporate governance category, audit quality, which consists of the presence of an audit 
committee, its independence, the frequency with which it meets, the adoption of a big 6 auditor and 
the auditor’s independence, is positively associated with the decision to disclose forward-looking 
information in financial reports. The corporate governance category, board committees, consisting 
of the appointment and independence of a compensation committee and the creation of a 
nomination committee, and the overall efficacy of the corporate governance system are also 
positively associated with the disclosure of forward-looking information.  In 2002, however, none 
of the governance categories are significantly associated with the firm’s decision to publish 
forward-looking information in financial reports. This is in spite of the finding that the strength of 
corporate governance in the sample firms increased between 2000 and 2002.  Hence, this result 
suggests that an increased application of corporate governance mechanisms does not necessarily 
lead to a higher incidence of disclosure, thereby calling into question the effectiveness of such 
mechanisms in promoting greater transparency.  
                                                 
2
 Some researchers have pointed out that a firm’s voluntary disclosure policy is related to both corporate governance and 
management incentives (Core, 2001; Bushman & Smith, 2001). Unfortunately, data on management incentives was not 
publicly available at the time of our study and hence we leave an examination of firms’ simultaneous choice of disclosure, 
corporate governance structure and management incentives to a future study.  
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 The paper is structured in the following way.  The next section provides the institutional 
framework for forward-looking information. The third section discusses prior research and develops 
the hypotheses. Data and method are described in the fourth section while the results are presented 
in fifth section.  The final section provides the concluding comments. 
 
Institutional background 
There are no disclosure rules that relate expressly to earnings forecasts. The decision of whether and 
how to release forward-looking statements, such as profit projections within the annual report, is 
ultimately determined by managerial discretion.  There are, however, a number of financial 
reporting guidelines that may have implications for the inclusion of earnings forecasts in the annual 
report. Many countries have mandated the inclusion of a Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) or Discussion and Analysis (D&A) within the annual report. Such nations have not 
compelled the disclosure of forward-looking information within statutory D&A, however it remains 
a likely vehicle for the voluntary disclosure of such data.  
For example, 1980 saw the introduction of statutory MD&A requirements in the United 
States (US), including discussions of liquidity, capital resources and the results of operations.  The 
incorporation of forward-looking information such as earnings forecasts is promoted but not 
mandated. In 1989, Canada introduced legislation based on the US model requiring the inclusion of 
an MD&A within corporate annual reports. Although the provision of forward-looking information 
is not obligatory, it is strongly espoused by the Ontario Securities Commission. Similarly, in the 
United Kingdom (UK), the Accounting Standards Board has formally withdrawn Reporting 
Statement (RS) 1 Operating and Financial Review and replaced it with a statement of best practice, 
the Reporting Statement “The Operating and Financial Review”.  
In Australia, the Corporations Law3, Australian Accounting Standards and the ASX Listing 
                                                 
3
 The Corporations Act 2001 became the new Federal Corporations Law commencing on 15 July 2001. Its enactment is 
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Rules and Guidance Notes all influence the nature of disclosures made within annual reports. D&A 
requirements were first introduced in 1998 with the release of AASB 1039 – Concise Financial 
Reports.4 Given that many companies issue concise reports, AASB 1039 has made significant 
inroads into introducing D&A requirements into Australian accounting regulation. However, the 
standard does not specifically espouse the disclosure of forward-looking information within such 
discussion.  
In September 1999, the ASX introduced the requirement for a review of operations to be 
included in directors’ reports effective from 2000.  ASX Guidance Note “Review of Operations and 
Activities: Listing Rule 4.10” provides guidance on the preparation of the company’s review of 
operations and financial conditions, including identifying items to be included in such a review. 
Specifically, as it pertains to forward-looking information, a review of operations should include 
among other things, “operating results of the company ….. including a comparison to prior periods 
and any projections published by the company …” and “investments for future performance”.  
Our study’s focus on the years 2000 and 2002 is particularly significant in light of the 
changes to Australian regulation around that the time. A starting point of 2000 meant that listed 
companies were required to include a review of operations in their directors’ reports for the first 
time in that year. However, most had been producing similar information in the D&A in their 
Concise Annual Reports since 1998, giving time for “good practice” to be established. Furthermore, 
our comparison year of 2002 preceded a number of important changes to regulation affecting both 
                                                                                                                                                     
the result of Commonwealth, State and Territory cooperation to fix the problematic constitutionality of the previous 
Corporations Law scheme identified by the High Court. As a result, corporate annual reports for the year 2000 would have 
been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Corporations Law, however the Corporations Act 2001 would 
apply to the 2002 financial reports. 
4 Section 314 of the Company Law Review Act (CLRA) allows companies and other registered bodies to send either a 
full traditional annual report or a concise report (containing a profit and loss statement, balance sheet, statement of cash 
flows and a D&A) to its members.  
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corporate disclosure and corporate governance.5 Hence, the comparatively stable time period chosen 
for our study enables us to minimize the effects of regulatory change on both disclosure and 
governance requirements.  
 
Prior research and hypothesis development 
 
The UK Cadbury Committee (Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992) 
is credited with providing the momentum for the emergence of studies in the area of corporate 
governance (Bujaki & McConomy, 2002). Specifically, the implementation of certain corporate 
governance mechanisms is reported to improve financial reporting quality in general, as well as 
disclosure transparency, and the standard and extent of voluntary disclosure. For example, studies 
find a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure and the number of independent directors 
on the board (Leftwich, Watts & Zimmerman, 1981; Forker, 1992), the presence of an audit 
committee (Forker, 1992), the dispersion of shareholdings (Hossain, Tan & Adams, 1994) and a 
higher level of institutional ownership (Bushee & Noe, 2000). Further, Narayanan (2000) 
demonstrates analytically that voluntary disclosure increases as managerial compensation becomes 
more sensitive to stock prices.  In a recent Australian study, Beekes and Brown (2006) report that 
firms with a higher overall standard of corporate governance tend to make more informative 
disclosures. A firm’s standard of corporate governance is captured by a governance rating which 
takes into account attributes such as the independence of the board, its chairman and major 
committees. 
Several studies have found a relation between prospective information and various 
corporate governance factors.  Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that the likelihood of making a 
                                                 
5
 Revised Guidance by the Group of 100 for the Review of Operations, CLERP 9 changes to the Corporations Law with 
respect to audit independence, and the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s Best Practice Recommendations were all 
released in 2003. S299A Operating and Financial Review requirements were introduced in the Corporations Law in 2004.  
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management earnings forecast is positively associated with stronger corporate governance in the 
form of more outside directors on the board, a lower level of managerial share ownership, a higher 
level of institutional share ownership and a smaller audit committee.  Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and 
Sengupta (2005) report that firms with more independent boards and greater institutional ownership 
are more likely to issue a management earnings forecast and to forecast more frequently. In the 
course of investigating the relationship between the level of prospective information disclosed and a 
firm’s investment opportunity set, Hossain, Ahmed and Godfrey (2005) also find the percentage of 
outside directors on the board to be a significant variable in explaining voluntary disclosure. 
Finally, Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) determine that earnings forecasts are disclosed more 
frequently as the percentage of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation tied to stock prices 
increases.  
It is predicted in this study that a higher standard of corporate governance is associated with 
increased disclosure of future information in published financial reports.  We group the individual 
corporate governance attributes into four categories based on current research findings.  These 
categories are board autonomy, board committees, the extent of independent ownership and audit 
quality. These categories are then amalgamated into a summary measure of corporate governance.  
 
Board autonomy 
 
Board autonomy comprises four governance attributes, namely board independence, the absence of 
a dominant personality, chair independence and non-executive director shareholdings. It is widely 
accepted that a positive relationship exists between board independence, measured by the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board that are not grey (that is, outsiders with special 
ties to the company or management), and effective corporate governance (eg,  Core, Holthausen, & 
Larcker, 1999;  Young, 2000; Ho & Wong, 2001). It is argued that outside directors serve as more 
effective monitors of managerial behaviour, due to greater opportunities and incentives to exercise 
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control (Weisbach, 1988; Byrd & Hickman, 1992). Specifically, it is argued that board 
independence may decrease managerial perquisite consumption (Brickley & James, 1987). Further, 
independent directors are less likely to be intimidated by the CEO (Weisbach, 1988). Weisbach 
(1988) finds that the probability of CEO replacement following a period of poor corporate 
performance is higher for firms with a more independent board of directors. Similarly, Kosnick 
(1987) argues that demands for greenmail payments are more likely to be resisted by boards with a 
higher percentage of independent outside directors.   
 The presence of a dominant personality within the ranks of executive management is 
thought to hinder effective corporate governance. For example, one individual fulfilling the roles of 
both CEO and board chair will result in increased managerial domination (Molz, 1988).  The 
presence of a dominant personality is found to be associated with poor disclosure, due to the 
reduced quality of monitoring and increased benefits arising from the withholding of information 
(Forker, 1992). The independence of the board chair is demonstrated to enhance corporate 
performance (Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Donaldson & Davis, 1991), improve board effectiveness 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) and enhance the quality of corporate governance (Coulton, James, & 
Taylor, 2003) 
The extent of independence displayed by non-executive directors, as measured by the level 
of company shareholdings, leads to higher standards of corporate governance (Beasley, 1996).  
Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma (2004) find that a greater proportion of outside directors on the board 
is significantly correlated with a lower occurrence of corporate fraud.  
Hence, the independent variable of board autonomy forms the basis of the first hypothesis. 
Prior research investigating the board of directors reveals a positive relationship between board 
vigilance and the standard of firm disclosure. We therefore expect a more autonomous board to be 
associated with increased forward-looking disclosures. This gives rise to the following hypothesis: 
H1: A positive association exists between board autonomy and the voluntary disclosure of forward-
looking information in corporate annual reports.  
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Board committees 
 
Board committees incorporate the presence and independence of the compensation committee, as 
well as the appointment of a nomination committee. These committees are associated with 
improved corporate governance (Forker, 1992; Davis, 2001). While there are no reported studies 
that examine a linkage between the existence and structure of board committees and the disclosure 
of forward-looking information, there are studies that find a relation between more independent 
board committees and a lower level of both financial reporting problems and corporate fraud (Song 
and Windram, 2004; Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma, 2004). Both of these factors can be regarded as 
indicators of financial reporting quality. Since financial reports containing forward-looking 
information are more likely to be perceived as being of higher quality (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & 
Sengupta, 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005), we can expect the presence and quality of board 
committees to be associated with forward-looking disclosures.  Hence, this leads to our second 
hypothesis:    
H2: A positive association exists between the presence and quality of board committees and the 
voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information in corporate annual reports.  
 
Independent ownership  
 
The third category of corporate governance relates to the type of ownership structure inherent 
within the company. This category incorporates the degree of institutional ownership and block 
shareholdings, as well as ownership dispersion. Institutional investors have a stronger incentive to 
monitor managerial behaviour due to their large shareholdings (Byrd, Johnson, & Porter, 1998; 
DeFond, 1992). Substantial shareholders are also more inclined to scrutinise managerial 
performance, thereby improving corporate governance (Coulton, James & Taylor, 2003). For 
example, Denis and Serano (1996) find that external blockholders are instrumental in removing 
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poorly performing managers, after an unsuccessful corporate control bid.  
 The dispersion of shareholdings also influences the standard of governance. It is argued that 
within firms that are characterised by greater concentration of ownership, substantial shareholders 
wield increased power due to the size of their shareholdings.  It is easier for fewer substantial 
shareholders to voice an opinion to which management will be forced to listen (Yeoh & Jubb, 
2001). This includes requests for disclosing relevant information such as that relating to future 
expectations.  
The above arguments point to an association between the independence of ownership and 
forward-looking disclosures. Thus, our third hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: A positive association exists between independent ownership and voluntary disclosure of 
forward-looking information in corporate annual reports. 
 
Audit quality 
 
There is general consensus that the external audit constitutes a keystone of corporate governance 
(Cadbury Committee, 1992), in that external auditors serve as gatekeepers who monitor managerial 
behaviour on behalf of firm stakeholders. It is argued that without efficient gatekeeping, the very 
structure of corporate governance is in jeopardy (Coffee, 2001). The positive relationship existing 
between the external audit function and the standard of corporate governance is obviously 
strengthened by the quality of the auditor (Yeoh & Jubb, 2001).  This variable considers a number 
of facets often associated with improved audit quality, including the presence and independence of 
audit committees and the frequency of audit committee meetings. This is because an important role 
of audit committees is to monitor both audit quality and financial reporting quality (Walker, 2004; 
Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2005). Further, as the effectiveness of the auditor may 
enhance audit quality, auditor size and independence are also incorporated into the fourth 
independent variable. Hence, audit quality forms the basis of the next hypothesis: 
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H4:  A positive association exists between audit quality and voluntary disclosure of forward-
looking information in corporate annual reports.  
  
Summary corporate governance measure 
  
This study also examines the combined effect of all corporate governance categories within the firm 
on corporate disclosure of forward-looking information. Many prior studies investigate just one or 
two corporate governance mechanisms. However, an important contribution of this research is that 
it assigns an overall corporate governance score to each firm by combining the individual 
governance mechanisms within each of the four independent variables. This allows for the 
possibility that companies may choose from a portfolio of corporate governance mechanisms.  
However, given that stronger overall corporate governance should lead to improved financial 
reporting transparency, it is reasonable to expect that a stronger governance system (reflected in a 
higher corporate governance score) will be associated with more forward-looking disclosures. 
Hence, a firm’s overall governance score provides the foundation for the fifth hypothesis: 
H5: A positive association exists between the strength of a firm’s corporate governance system and 
the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information in corporate annual reports.  
 
Control variables 
  
Prior literature identifies a number of other factors also likely to have an impact upon a firm’s 
voluntary disclosure policy. The control variables included in the model are firm size, firm 
performance, information environment and leverage. Previous disclosure studies indicate that a 
positive association exists between voluntary disclosure and firm size (Kent & Ung, 2003). This 
relationship applies in the context of both disclosure quality (Lang & Lundholm, 1993) and quantity 
(Coulton, James, & Taylor, 2003). In relation to the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking 
 12 
information in particular, larger firms are also more likely to divulge earnings forecasts than smaller 
firms (Cox, 1987; Choon, Smith, & Taylor, 2000). 
 Empirical research finds that firm performance is associated with corporate disclosure, but 
results are mixed.  Many studies document a positive relationship between firm performance and 
voluntary disclosure (Lev & Penman, 1990; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997). With regard 
to forward-looking information, Cahan and Hossain (1996) report that strongly performing firms 
are more likely to voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts.  However, other studies suggest that 
relatively poor performers are prone to greater disclosure (Skinner, 1994 and 1997). Therefore, 
while a relationship is likely to exist between firm performance and voluntary disclosure, the 
direction is uncertain.  
 The firm’s information environment is another factor reported to shape a firm’s disclosure 
policy. Firstly, the extent of growth opportunities available to the firm is often used to reflect a 
firm’s information environment (Lang & Lundholm, 1993 and 1996).  In turn, firms with a higher 
percentage of growth options relative to assets-in-place are associated with increased disclosure 
(Hossain & Ahmed, 2000).  Other research suggests that the need for external finance to fund future 
growth opportunities prompts such firms to increase their voluntary disclosure (Core, 2001). 
Specifically, to decrease the unacceptably high level of information asymmetry characteristic of 
growth firms, these firms have an incentive to increase their voluntary disclosure to minimise the 
cost of capital (Strebel, 1996).  
A number of studies evaluate the association between firm leverage and disclosure. 
Voluntary disclosure can alleviate information asymmetry, thereby decreasing the borrower’s 
apparent risk of default, in turn reducing the cost of capital (Baiman & Verrecchia, 1996; Sengupta, 
1998).  Hence, managerial disclosure may be aimed at securing capital at minimum cost (Cooke, 
1989). However, it should also be noted that empirical studies present mixed findings. Some 
researchers document a positive relationship between leverage and voluntary disclosure (Bradbury, 
1992) while others fail to find any statistically significant association between leverage and 
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disclosure (Craswell & Taylor, 1992; Hossain, Tan, & Adams, 1994; Raffournier, 1995) or report a 
significant negative relationship (Meek, Gray, & and Roberts, 1995).  Thus the direction of the 
expected association is not predicted.   
 
Data and research method 
 
Data collection 
 
The data collection process involves the acquisition of the 2000 and 2002 published annual reports 
of the largest 300 publicly listed firms according to net profit for the year 2000, as identified in the 
Business Review Weekly (BRW). The years 2000 and 2002 are chosen for consideration in order to 
provide a contrast between the corporate governance structures in place within firms before and 
after a number of high-profile corporate collapses, such as Enron Corporation in the US and HIH 
Insurance Ltd in Australia.  In addition, as previously noted, this time period preceded a number of 
key changes to regulation which may have impacted corporate disclosure and corporate governance. 
The research design is adapted from the Canadian study of Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994) 
and tailored to an Australian institutional setting, with reference to Choon, Smith and Taylor 
(2000).   
The potential sample size is reduced by excluding listed property trusts, listed investment 
trusts, funds and trustee companies.6  We also exclude foreign listed firms and those companies 
where corporate annual reports fail to cover at least 6 months.  From the remaining 239 firms, we 
                                                 
6
 These entities are excluded on the basis that they are not expected to be forecasters, as they have more volatile earnings 
(Kent and Ung, 2003). Listed trusts are also subject to additional mandatory accounting requirements that may affect their 
accounting policy and disclosure decisions.  
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then select 200 companies on the basis that their annual reports can be readily obtained. In relation 
to the sample for 2002, certain firms have since delisted, reducing the sample size to 183 firms.  
 
Models 
The following logistic regression model is adopted to test Hypotheses 1 to 4: 
FLI = α + β1BOARD + β2COMMEE + β3OSHIP + β4AUDIT + β5SIZE + β6PERFORM +  
β7INFO + β8LEVG  + ε 
 Where: 
FLI    Disclosure of forward-looking information in financial report 
BOARD                       Board autonomy  
COMMEE          Presence and value of board committees  
OSHIP                          Independent ownership  
AUDIT                         Audit quality  
SIZE      Firm size 
PERFORM                   Firm performance 
INFO                            Information environment 
LEVG Firm leverage 
  
Our second model measures the effect of the firm’s overall corporate governance 
framework (CG) on the voluntary disclosure of prospective information and is used to test 
Hypothesis 5.  The model is specified as follows: 
FLI = α   +   β1CG  +  β2SIZE + β3PERFORM +  β4INFO + β5LEVG + ε 
Where: 
FLI    Disclosure of  forward-looking information in financial report 
CG Summary corporate governance score  
SIZE      Firm size 
PERFORM                   Firm performance 
INFO                            Information environment 
LEVG Firm leverage 
 
Specification of dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information in corporate 
financial reports.  This variable reflects but is not limited to earnings forecasts, which are the focus 
of the study conducted by Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994). Their definition of earnings 
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forecasts is adopted to assist with the identification of such statements within Australian financial 
reports:   
Unambiguous quantitative or qualitative statement of the expected direction of change in 
operating results for the upcoming fiscal year is included in its annual report. A non-
forecasting firm is one which hedges discussion so that the expected direction of change 
was unclear or if it involved either what-if scenarios (ie, sensitivity analyses) or forecasts of 
macro variables (eg, the economy, interest rates) without relating them to the firm’s own 
operating results. (p. 429) 
 
 The application of this definition however does not preclude the investigation of other 
forward-looking information which does not qualify as an earnings forecast. Rather, provided the 
projection can be classified in terms of the following four characteristics, it is recognised as a 
forward-looking statement for the purposes of this study: 
direction (up, down or no change); 
type (income/profit, cash flow, sales/revenue); 
location (Directors’ Report, CEO’s/Managing Director’s Report, Review of Operations, 
Chairman’s Report, D&A and other); and 
nature (qualitative, quantitative). 
 
 To determine whether sample firms disclose forward-looking information within their 
annual financial reports, all narrative matter in the full and concise financial reports is read.   The 
dependent variable, FLI, is dichotomous.  It is assigned a value of one if the company discloses 
forward-looking information within its corporate financial report and zero otherwise. 
 
Specification of independent variables 
 
Figure 1 summarises each of the independent variables, together with the corporate governance 
attributes, the way in which these attributes are measured, and their expected relationship with 
voluntary disclosure. A similar procedure to Brown and Caylor (2006) is followed in this study. 
They use detailed corporate governance data encompassing 51 provisions spanning eight 
governance dimensions to create a broad summary corporate governance measure.  Brown and 
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Caylor code each of the 51 factors as either 1 or 0 depending on whether Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) considers the firm’s governance for that attribute to be minimally acceptable.  These 
binary variables are then summed to derive a corporate governance score.  Each of the 51 corporate 
governance provisions are categorised into one of the eight governance dimensions of ISS.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Another similar study is that of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) who construct a 
“Governance Index” using the incidence of 24 governance rules to proxy for the level of 
shareholder rights at about 1500 large US firms in the 1990s.  The main data source for the study is 
the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC), which publishes detailed listings of corporate 
governance provisions used in the defence of a takeover. The researchers divide these provisions 
into five groups including, for example, tactics for delaying hostile bidders.   
A more intricate analysis of corporate governance measures is undertaken by Larcker, 
Richardson and Tuna (2005) who examine the relation between a broad set of corporate governance 
indicators and various measures of managerial decision making and organizational performance. 
Their method involves extracting 39 structural measures of corporate governance from a sample of 
2,106 firms and combining them into 14 governance constructs using principal components 
analysis.  
In our study, the measures of corporate governance attributes and the research that supports 
these measures is presented in Figure 1. The first independent variable, board autonomy (BOARD), 
reflects board independence, the absence of a dominant personality within the firm, the 
independence of the chair and non-executive director shareholdings. Board independence is 
captured by the percentage of non-executive directors comprising the board that are not grey 
directors.  The absence of a dominant personality refers to the separation of the roles of CEO and 
board chair.  The independence of the chair is concerned with the appointment of a non-executive 
director to the position of board chair.  Lastly, the percentage of non-executive director share 
ownership is used to reflect director independence.  
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The corporate governance attributes comprising the category BOARD (as well as the other 
corporate governance categories) are assessed according to whether they are represented by binary 
or continuous values.   In the case of dummy variables, their actual value is added to the score for 
BOARD.  With respect to continuous variables, their impact upon a firm’s corporate governance 
index depends on their magnitude with respect to the average value of that variable for all firms. If a 
firm exhibits a continuous variable greater than or equal to the mean, one point is added to its 
corporate governance score. Conversely, if the value of a firm’s continuous variable for that 
governance attribute is lower than the mean, no points accumulate toward the BOARD score.  
Given that four internal corporate governance attributes are considered to calculate a score for the 
first independent variable, the maximum value for BOARD is four.  However, in order that no one 
governance variable is implicitly assumed to have a greater impact on the firm’s corporate 
governance structure than any other, individual scores for each independent variable are 
standardised to one. This is achieved by dividing each component score by the number of attributes 
reflected in that component. For example, the score reflecting the variable BOARD is comprised of 
four governance attributes and is thus divided by four. 
The second independent variable relates to board committees (COMMEE) and is comprised 
of three separate corporate governance attributes.  The presence and independence of a 
compensation committee, as well as the appointment of a nomination committee are determined to 
calculate the value of the COMMEE score. We use the percentage of committee members who are 
non-executive and not grey directors to measure the independence of the compensation committee. 
The next independent variable considers the ownership structure prevalent within the firm 
(OSHIP). The extent of institutional ownership is determined by whether or not the largest 
shareholder within the firm is an institution.7 The presence of block holdings within firms is 
                                                 
7
 With respect to the notion of institutional investment, further elucidation is required.  First, the ASX defines an  
investment institution as follows: 
those bodies with large investable funds, for example, pension funds, insurance and assurance companies.  
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captured by the percentage of ordinary shareholders’ equity held by block shareholders (where 
holdings of greater than 5% of ordinary shareholders’ equity comprise a block holding). Finally, the 
percentage of shareholdings held by the top twenty investors captures the concentration of firm 
shareholdings.  
 The final measure of corporate governance pertains to the audit function. A firm’s audit 
quality (AUDIT) is assessed by determining whether the firm has appointed an audit committee and 
how often that committee meets.8 In addition, the extent of that committee’s independence is 
reflected in the proportion of non-executive directors comprising the committee, where such 
directors are not grey. Further, audit firm size is used to gauge audit quality, with reference to 
whether or not the auditor is a Big 6 firm. Although the market perceives Big 6 auditors to be of 
higher quality (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003), certain misgivings have emerged regarding the 
validity of using this proxy to capture audit quality. As a result, the more recent measure of auditor 
independence as reflected in fees paid for the provision of non-audit services is also incorporated 
into the AUDIT variable (DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002). Specifically, the lower 
                                                                                                                                                     
Within an Australian setting, a publicly listed institutional investor will fall within one of the following three industry 
groupings of banks, investment and financial services and insurance.  On a practical level, the above guidelines will not 
capture all possible institutional investors, necessitating that further rules of classification be applied in order that non-
institutional investors be accurately identified.  As a general rule, an entity will not be considered an institutional investor 
where it is a: 
- private company within Australia or overseas; or 
   - foreign corporation within an industry dissimilar to the Australian industry groupings of banks, insurance, investment 
and financial services. 
8
 The use of audit committees is included in the measure of audit quality (rather than board committees), given the close 
relationship observed between these two aspects of corporate governance. Indeed, the Cadbury Committee (1992) 
maintains that an audit committee should provide a structure within which external auditors can affirm their 
independence, as well as strengthening the internal audit function. Further, Abbott and Parker (1999) argue that an active 
and independent audit committee is more inclined to demand higher audit quality.  
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the amount of fees paid by clients, to their auditors for non-audit services, the more independent the 
auditor.   
 The final independent variable is a summary measure of corporate governance, which takes 
into account values calculated for the categories, BOARD, COMMEE, OSHIP and AUDIT. We 
calculate an overall corporate governance score (CG) for each company, by adding together the 
standardised values for each of the preceding four independent variables. It follows that the highest 
possible overall governance score for a firm is four.  This approach is similar to that of Yeoh and 
Jubb (2001) who compute an overall score to reflect corporate governance within a firm, whilst 
investigating an association between corporate governance and audit quality.  
 
Specification of control variables  
 
Figure 2 presents each of the controls, along with the proxies used to capture their values and 
expected associations with voluntary disclosure. The size of the firm (SIZE) is measured by the log 
of sales. Return on assets is used as a proxy for firm performance (PERFORM), while the book-to-
market ratio reflects the firm’s information environment (INFO). Lastly, the debt-to-total assets 
ratio is employed as the surrogate for firm leverage (LEVG).  The regressions are repeated using 
alternative specifications of the control variables.9  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Results 
 
                                                 
9
 The second set of proxies for the control variables also incorporates the debt-to-total assets (LEVG) and book-to-market 
ratios (INFO). However, the log of total assets is used to reflect firm size (SIZE), whereas the earnings per share ratio is 
substituted to capture firm performance (PERFORM). The final set of surrogates applied to determine the robustness of 
the original regression results, does not introduce any new measures. It consists of the log of sales (SIZE), earnings-per-
share (PERFORM), earnings-price ratio (INFO) and debt-to-total assets (LEVG). 
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Nature of forward-looking information disclosed  
 
Table 1 summarises the characteristics of forward-looking information collected from the annual 
reports for sample firms for the years 2000 and 2002 respectively. The published financial reports 
of the firms are perused to ascertain whether forward-looking information is included within the 
narrative material, as well as the type of forward-looking information that is disclosed.  Table 1 
indicates that in 2000 a total of 282 forward-looking statements are made by 102 firms. The 
majority (79%) of these statements are qualitative in nature, and predict an upward movement in 
firm performance (88%). Most statements are made within the chairperson’s and/or the CEO’s 
reports.  A similar trend is identified for 2002, with 103 firms making a total of 297 forward-
looking statements. Again, the majority of these statements are qualitative (83%), anticipate an 
improvement in corporate performance (97%) and appear within the chairperson’s and/or the 
CEO’s reports. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 summarises the descriptive statistics for the overall governance scores, the four independent 
variables and the individual governance attributes for the years 2000 and 2002 respectively. The 
table shows that the mean value of the overall governance score for all firms is 2.28 for 2000, 
increasing to 2.70 for 2002. An ANOVA test reveals that these are significantly different at p < 
0.001. The scores for both years approximate a normal distribution.  Further analysis indicates that, 
in 2000, the firm with the highest corporate governance score does in fact disclose forward-looking 
information while the firm with the lowest corporate governance score does not reveal any forward-
looking information.  Also worthy of note is the fact that the number of firms with the maximum 
corporate governance score grew from only one firm in the year 2000 to twelve firms for 2002. Of 
these twelve firms, eight disclose forward-looking information within their financial reports. Two 
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companies exhibit the minimum corporate governance score, and neither of these makes any 
forward-looking statements within their financial reports. Incidentally, the minimum corporate 
governance score also shows substantial improvement from 2000 to 2002.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
None of the four independent variables deviate substantially from a normal distribution, as 
evidenced by their values of skewness and kurtosis (not reported).  Further, the mean values of three 
of the four variables increase from 2000 to 2002, indicating an overall improvement in corporate 
governance. An ANOVA test reveals that these three variables, OSHIP, BOARD and AUDIT, are 
significantly different at p < 0.001.  Indeed, OSHIP (independent ownership) in particular shows a 
marked increase from 2000 to 2002.  Descriptive statistics for the individual governance attributes 
also indicate that, in general, the mean values increase from 2000 to 2002.10 
Table 3 provides the mean corporate governance scores and independent sample tests for 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms. The table shows that the mean overall corporate governance 
score of disclosing firms (2.40) is higher than that of non-disclosers (2.16).  This result is 
statistically significant (p = 0.0009).  However, in 2002, there is no significant difference between 
the mean scores for disclosing (2.69) and non-disclosing (2.71) firms.   
Insert Table 3 about here 
This table also presents the mean values for each of the four governance categories for the 
two years under investigation. In relation to the year 2000, the analysis suggests that firms 
disclosing forward-looking information exhibit stronger corporate governance in two categories. 
The mean values for COMMEE (the presence and quality of board committees) and AUDIT (audit 
quality) are higher for disclosing firms than non-disclosing firms. T-tests indicate that these results 
are statistically significant (p = 0.0022 for COMMEE and p = 0.0008 for AUDIT).  The categories 
BOARD (board autonomy) and OSHIP (independent ownership) do not differ significantly between 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms. With respect to 2002, differences between the disclosing and 
                                                 
10
 The results are rerun with all continuous variables standardized.  The results stay essentially unchanged.  
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non-disclosing firms in terms of corporate governance are generally not statistically significant. The 
one exception is the category BOARD, which is marginally significant (p = .0981) but in the 
opposite direction to that predicted.  
The results of Mann-Whitney Tests for the fifteen individual corporate governance 
attributes that comprise the four categories of corporate governance are also reported in Table 3.11  
Disclosing firms exhibit stronger governance attributes than non-disclosing firms, for ten of the 
fifteen measures outlined above. At one-tailed significance levels, there are statistically significant 
differences between disclosing and non-disclosing firms in terms of six corporate governance 
attributes.  Specifically, disclosing firms are more likely to form audit and compensation 
committees, as well as appoint Big 6 auditors, than non-disclosing firms. Further, the audit 
committee of the former is likely to be more independent than that of the latter. At a 10% level of 
significance, both non-executive director ownership and independence of the compensation 
committee are also significant. In 2002, the results indicate that disclosing firms exhibit stronger 
corporate governance with respect to only seven of the fifteen attributes outlined above.  However, 
in contrast to the results for 2000, none of the differences in the corporate governance attributes of 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms are statistically significant.    
The average value of the corporate governance score for all firms (i.e., 2.28 for 2000 and 
2.70 for 2002 as shown in Table 2) is then used to classify the firms as having either weaker 
corporate governance (less than mean score) or stronger corporate governance (greater than or equal 
to the mean score).12 Table 4 shows whether or not these firms disclose forward-looking 
information. In relation to the year 2000, 110 firms are found to have stronger corporate 
                                                 
11
 Non-parametric tests are undertaken for these variables because tests indicate that in some cases, the assumptions of 
normality are violated. However, the results reported do not differ materially from those of parametric tests. 
12
 It should be noted that, as our variable is constructed dichotomously as an observation above or below the mean, some 
firms may have been classified in the “stronger” governance group in 2000 and the “weaker” governance group in 2002, 
even though their corporate governance score had improved between the two periods. 
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governance, while 90 companies have weaker corporate governance systems. Of the 110 firms with 
relatively strong governance systems, a majority of 64 firms are disclosers of forward-looking 
information. Conversely, of the 90 firms with weaker corporate governance, a majority of 52 firms 
do not disclose forward-looking information. A chi-squared test indicates that this difference is 
statistically significant ((p = 0.025), demonstrating that firms with stronger corporate governance 
are more likely to disclose forward-looking information.  For 2002, the difference between 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms in terms of their corporate governance has narrowed 
considerably. Both groups are slightly more likely to disclose forward-looking information and the 
chi-squared test is not significant (p = 0.193).  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 
 
 
Logistic regression results 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the two logistic regression models for the year 2000. The table 
indicates that all independent variables are moving in the predicted direction.13  In the first 
regression model, only the presence and quality of board committees (COMMEE) and audit quality 
(AUDIT) are statistically significant. The former returns a Wald Statistic of 2.029 at the 10% 
significance level (p = 0.077). The latter has an associated Wald Statistic of 4.051, at the 5% level 
of significance (p = 0.022). Of the control variables, only INFO is statistically significant at a 10% 
level of significance (p = 0.084).  The Chi-square of 19.445 is significant at p = 0.013.  The 
Nagelkerke R Square indicates that 12.4% of the decision to disclose forward-looking information 
is explained by the first model. These results provide support for Hypotheses 2 and 4 for the year 
2000. However, there is no support for Hypotheses 1 and 3. 
                                                 
13
 The Spearman correlation coefficients (not reported ) reveal that, although several statistically significant correlations 
are discovered between some of the variables, none of these are highly correlated.  
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Insert Table 5 about here 
The second logistic regression incorporates the overall measure of corporate governance 
(CG) and the four control variables (SIZE, PERFORM, INFO, LEVG).  The table shows that CG is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (p = 0.018).  This indicates that the strength of the firm’s 
corporate governance framework in the year 2000 is positively associated with the disclosure of 
forward-looking information in financial reports. Hence, Hypothesis 5 is supported for the year 
2000. Of the control variables, SIZE and INFO are significant (p = 0.045 and p = 0.063 
respectively).  This suggests that larger firms may be motivated to disclose forward-looking 
information to mitigate their political costs. Firms may also decide to publish prospective 
information to alleviate information asymmetry surrounding high growth firms.  The Nagelkerke R 
Square indicates that 10% of the decision to disclose forward-looking information is explained by 
the model, while the chi-square statistic resulting from the omnibus test of model coefficients is 
significant at the 1% level (p = 0.008).  
Table 6 reports the results of the two logistic regression models for the year 2002. The table 
indicates that only one of the independent variables (AUDIT) is moving in the predicted positive 
direction, but the result is not statistically significant.14 Accordingly, none of the hypotheses are 
supported for the year 2002. Of the control variables, only LEVG is statistically significant, at a 1% 
level of significance (p = 0.002 in the first model and p = 0.004 in the second model).  This result 
differs from 2000, where leverage exhibits a positive but insignificant relationship with the 
dependent variable, suggesting that gearing is more powerful in terms of motivating the disclosure 
of forward-looking information in 2002 compared to 2000. The Chi-square statistic is significant in 
both models (p=0.079 in the first model and p = 0.049 in the second model) while the Nagelkerke R 
Square indicates that the models respectively explain 10% and 8% of the decision to disclose 
                                                 
14
 The Spearman correlation coefficients (not reported ) reveal that there are no significant correlations exhibited between 
the variables are below 0.5, apart from that exhibited between AUDIT and COMMEE, which is calculated to be 0.551.   
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forward-looking information.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Overall, these results point to some important differences between 2000 and 2002. With 
respect to the year 2000, audit quality (AUDIT), the presence and quality of board committees 
(COMMEE) and the overall efficacy of the corporate governance system (CG) are positively 
associated with the disclosure of forward-looking information. Also, the information environment 
(INFO) of the sample firms for 2000 has a significant and positive effect on the disclosure of 
forward-looking information, as does firm size.  However, the disclosure of forward-looking 
information does not seem to be driven by the same factors in 2002.  In spite of the apparent 
strengthening of corporate governance, none of the governance attributes are significantly 
associated with the disclosure of forward-looking information. However, firm leverage (LEVG) 
appears to have a strong positive association with the disclosure of this information.15 
 
Concluding comments  
 
In this study we investigate the association between a firm’s corporate governance framework and 
the decision to voluntarily disclose forward-looking information in its published financial reports. 
The forward-looking information disclosed by sample firms exhibits certain common 
characteristics. The majority of disclosing firms publish qualitative forward-looking information 
within reports prepared by the chief executive officer, chairman and managing director.  Further, 
such statements tend to be expressed in terms of expecting an upward movement in such measures 
as profit, earnings or income. This trend persists for both 2000 and 2002.   
Our results show that disclosing firms typically experience a higher standard of corporate 
governance than non-disclosing firms, but only for the year 2000.  With respect to that year, our 
logistic regression results show that the corporate governance category audit quality is positively 
                                                 
15
 The results remain largely unaltered when alternative specifications of the control variables are used. 
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associated with the decision to disclose forward-looking information in financial reports. The 
category board committees is also positively associated with the disclosure of forward-looking 
information as is the overall efficacy of the corporate governance system. In 2002, none of the 
governance categories are significantly associated with the firm’s decision to publish forward-
looking information in financial reports.  This result is in spite of the increase in corporate 
governance scores for firms from 2000 to 2002 which suggest an across-the-board improvement in 
corporate governance during this period.  Hence, while corporate scandals such as those involving 
Enron Corporation in the US, Parmalat in Europe and HIH Insurance Ltd in Australia saw corporate 
governance take global centre stage, it appears that this did not lead to a greater level of disclosure, 
at least in the context of forward-looking information.16 
The study has a number of limitations.  The use of an index of governance mechanisms to 
arrive at an overall corporate governance score involves attaching an equal weighting to the various 
governance attributes.  This assumes that every attribute is equally important to all firms. A further 
problem arises from the need to transform continuous scores to dichotomous variables in order to 
integrate them into the composite score. Splitting around the mean is a somewhat arbitrary way of 
dichotomising the variable and classification problems arise for those companies just above or 
below the mean value. An additional problem arises when comparing across the two years since 
some firms may be classified differently over the two year period because of changes in the means, 
even though their individual scores do not change. Further, using summary categories of corporate 
governance characteristics has the potential to mask major underlying relationships (Larcker, 
Richardson, & Tuna, 2005). The sample in this study is selected from the top 300 firms by net 
profit, for the years 2000 and 2002, subject to certain exclusions. Examining a non-random sample 
                                                 
16
 It is also possible that the corporate collapses, together with world events such as terrorist attacks, led to 
increased uncertainty across global capital markets between 2000 and 2002. This greater level of uncertainty 
could have impacted on the willingness of companies to disclose information about the future. This provides 
an alternative explanation for the failure to find an increase in disclosure in spite of stronger corporate 
governance in 2002. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this possibility. 
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of firms introduces an inherent bias into the study (Watts, 1994) as larger, more profitable firms are 
expected to disclose more information (including prospective data). The selection criterion may also 
have led to the non-significant results for our performance control variable. Another potential 
concern of the study is the “staleness” issue wherein the “annual report may not be a timely 
disclosure medium” (Clarkson, Kao & Richardson, 1994 p. 445). Specifically, if firms pre-empt 
disclosures in annual reports using alternative media (eg, press releases), such disclosures would not 
constitute news to the market and as such, the “predictions of the voluntary disclosure literature 
would not apply”. Firms may pre-empt disclosures via alternative means of communication or 
decide to only reveal information within such media, totally bypassing the annual report.  Indeed, 
Chan, Faff, Ho, and Ramsay (2006) report that 2,424 earnings-related prior announcements, 
wherein management referred to current period or future period profits, revenues, 
distributions/dividends or production, were made to the ASX over the period September 1994 to 
December 2001. 
In spite of these limitations, the results of this study contribute to the relevant literature in a 
number of ways.  First, we provide a deeper examination of voluntary corporate disclosure. The 
study addresses the broader category of disclosure of forward-looking information in financial 
reports, which includes but is not limited to quantitative earnings projections. Second, the study 
provides a more thorough representation of corporate governance within the firm by considering 
fifteen governance devices. Third, our comparison of results between 2000 and 2002 reveals a 
marked reduction in the association between corporate governance and the disclosure of forward-
looking information in spite of a strengthening of governance during the period. These findings are 
particularly relevant to corporate regulators and policy makers, given the global interest in corporate 
governance and its expected role in improving the integrity and transparency of financial reports. 
Indeed, our findings cast some doubt on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms to 
promote transparency and hence improve market confidence.  
 Future research could extend the study by expanding the time period under consideration.  
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In particular, it may be worthwhile to consider whether the improvements in corporate governance 
exhibited from 2000 to 2002 have been sustained. Additional research could further expand the 
study by altering the sample selection criteria to remove any bias based on size or profitability.  
Finally, an important contribution to the literature would be to examine the association between 
corporate governance variables and the disclosure of forward-looking information in media other 
than annual reports.  
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Figure 1 
Independent variables 
Independent 
Variable 
Corporate Governance 
Attribute 
Measure Reference Expected 
Relationship:  
Board Autonomy  (BOARD)  
 Board independence % of non-executive 
directors on the board 
..that are not grey directors 
Leftwich, Watts & 
Zimmerman (1981); 
Forker (1992); 
Core, Holthausen & 
Larcker (1999) 
+ 
 Absence of dominant 
personality 
Separation of roles of CEO 
and Chairperson 
Coulton, James & Taylor,( 
2003) 
+ 
 Independence of the 
chair 
Chairperson is non-
executive director 
Coulton, James & Taylor 
(2003) 
+ 
 Outside director 
ownership 
% of outside director share 
ownership 
Beasley (1996) 
- 
Presence and Quality of Board Committees  (COMMEE) 
 Compensation 
committee 
Firm has compensation 
committee 
Davis (2001) + 
  Independence of 
compensation 
committee 
% of non-executive 
directors on compensation 
committee 
..that are not grey directors 
Byrd., Johnson & Porter 
(1998) 
 
Core, Holthausen & 
Larcker (1999) 
+ 
 Nomination committee Firm has nomination 
committee 
Davis (2001) + 
Independent  Ownership (OSHIP) 
 Institutional ownership Top shareholder is 
institutional investor 
Brickley, Lease & Smith 
(1988) 
+ 
 Block shareholdings % of ordinary shareholders’ 
equity held by block 
shareholders (i.e. more than 
5% of  ordinary 
shareholders’ equity) 
Coulton, James & Taylor 
(2003) 
+ 
 Concentration of 
shareholdings 
% of shareholdings held by 
top 20 investors  
Yeoh and Jubb  (2001) + 
Audit quality (AUDIT) 
 Audit committee  Firm has audit committee Forker (1992) 
Ho and Wong (2001) 
+ 
 Independence of audit 
committee 
% of non-executive 
directors on audit committee 
..that are not grey directors 
Wright (2001) 
 
Core, Holthausen & Lrcker 
(1999) 
+ 
 Frequency of audit 
committee meetings 
Number of audit committee 
meetings per year 
Peasnell.,Pope & Young 
(2005) 
 McMullen & 
Raghunandan (1996) 
+ 
 Audit firm size 
 
 
Big 6  or non-Big 6 Lennox (1999)  
Yeoh and Jubb (2001) 
Coulton, James & Taylor 
(2003) 
+ 
 
 Auditor independence Audit fees as % of total fees 
paid to auditor 
DeFond.,Raghunandan & 
Subramanyam (2002) 
+ 
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Figure 2 
Control variables 
 
Control Proxy Expected 
Relationship 
with Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Firm size 
SIZE 
Log of sales; 
Log of total assets (alternative)(Coulton, James & Taylor, 
2003); 
+ 
Firm performance 
PERFORM 
 
Accounting-based measure: Return on assets 
Market-based measure: Earnings per share 
(AICPA 2001) 
? 
 
 
Information 
environment 
INFO 
: growth 
opportunities 
 
 
 
 
Book value of firm equity/market value of firm equity (Lang 
and Lundholm 1993, 1996); 
Earnings/price ratio (alternative); 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
Leverage 
LEVG 
Debt to assets 
(Osteryoung 2002, p. 2) 
Interest coverage (alternative); 
? 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of Forward-Looking Information 
 
2000 
(282 statements – 
102 firms) 
2002 
(297 statements – 
103 firms) Characteristics 
# Statements % # Statements % 
Qualitative 224 79 246 83 
Quantitative 58 21 51 17 
  100  100 
Relate to profit/earnings/income 152 54 147 49 
Relate to cash flows 5 2 17 6 
Relate to sales/revenue 125 44 133 45 
  100  100 
In Directors’ Report 23 8 12 4 
In CEO's/Chairman’s Report 115 41 151 51 
In Review of Operations 73 26 102 34 
In D&A 5 2 3 1 
In Other Narrative 66 23 29 10 
  100  100 
Indicate upward movement 248 88 288 97 
Indicate downward movement 22 8 4 1 
Indicate no change 12 4 5 2 
  100  100 
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Table 2 
Corporate Governance Variables (2000 v 2002) 
 
Variable Attribute 2000 2002 
   Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max 
OVERALL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE 
(2000 v 2002: p <  0.001)1 2.28 2.35 0.65 3.5 2.7 2.8 1.32 3.5 
BOARD  (2000 v 2002: p < 0.001) 0.589 0.500 0 1 0.568 0.500 0 1 
  Dominant Personality 0.890 1 0 1 0.891 1 0 1 
  Chair Independence 0.815 1 0 1 0.842 1 0 1 
  Board Independence 0.552 0.600 0 1 0.533 0.563 0 1 
  Non-executive Director Ownership 0.056 0.003 0 0.928 0.058 0.004 0 0.661 
COMMEE (2000 v 2002: p = 0.121) 0.508 0.667 0 1 0.510 0.667 0 1 
  Compensation Committee 0.740 1 0 1 0.796 1 0 1 
  Independence of Compensation Committee 0.657 0.667 0 1 0.673 0.750 0 1 
  Nomination Committee 0.285 0 0 1 0.320 0 0 1 
OSHIP  (2000 v 2002: p < 0.001) 0.503 0.667 0 1 0.834 1 0.667 1 
  Top Institutional Owner 0.485 0 0 1 0.503 1 0 1 
  Block Shareholdings 39.390 37.830 0 97.660 41.834 42.500 0 97.760 
  Concentration of Shareholdings 63.748 66.360 0.498 99.460 64.140 65.530 12 99.290 
AUDIT (2000 v 2002:p < 0.001) 0.676 0.600 0 1 0.781 0.800 0.200 1 
  Audit Committee 0.960 1 0 1 0.978 1 0 1 
  Independence of Audit Committee 0.652 0.667 0 1 0.674 0.667 0 1 
  Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings 3.599 4 0 14 3.989 4 1 14 
  Big 6 Auditor 0.885 1 0 1 0.907 1 0 1 
  Independence of Auditor 0.546 0.533 0.069 1 0.562 0.553 0.087 1 
Variable Definitions: BOARD Board autonomy (standardised value)                                                             
 COMMEE Presence and quality of board committees (standardised value)                       
 OSHIP Independent ownership (standardised value)                                                    
 AUDIT Audit quality (standardised value) 
1 = ANOVA RESULTS 
  
 40 
Table 3 
Disclosers v Non-Disclosers (2000 v 2002) 
 
Independent Variable 2000 2002 
 Governance Attribute 
Discloser 
of FLI 
Non-
Discloser T-statistic Z-statistic 
Discloser 
of FLI 
Non-
Discloser T-statistic 
Z-
statistic 
OVERALL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE 2.40 2.16 
-
3.156***  2.69 2.71 -0.240  
BOARD  0.576 0.602 -0.894  0.553 0.588 -1.297*  
 Dominant Personality 102.68 98.23  1.001 90.45 93.99  0.830 
 Chair Independence 100.37 100.63  0.047 90.51 93.92  0.683 
 Board Independence 104.68 96.15  1.043 91.40 92.77  0.173 
 Non-executive Director Ownership 93.7 107.58  1.696* 90.69 93.69  0.380 
COMMEE  0.578 0.435 2.878**  0.515 0.504 0.207  
 Compensation Committee 111.79 88.74  3.706*** 95.30 87.75  1.348 
 Independence of Compensation Committee 78.62 68.78  1.409* 72.67 73.47  0.116 
 Nomination Committee 100.43 100.57  0.022 87.76 97.46  1.510 
OSHIP  0.513 0.493 0.513  0.828 0.842 -0.528 
 
 Top Institutional Owner 99.80 100.21  0.058 90.42 94.04  0.530 
 Block Shareholdings 101.25 98.68  0.315 93.35 90.26  0.391 
 Concentration of Shareholdings 100.78 98.17  0.320 92.33 91.58  0.094 
AUDIT  0.72 0.631 3.189***  0.790 0.773 0.731  
 Audit Committee 103.52 97.36  2.218** 93.10 90.59  1.031 
 Independence of Audit Committee 104.19 87.96  2.070** 86.52 92.30  0.770 
 Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings 99.56 93.10  0.824 90.35 89.53  0.107 
 Big 6 Auditor 105.14 95.67  2.092** 93.39 90.21  0.803 
 Independence of Auditor 97.44 103.69  0.764 93.47 90.11  0.425 
Variable Definitions: BOARD Board autonomy (standardised value)                                                             *** = Significant at 1% 
     COMMEE Presence and quality of board committees (standardised value)                       **= Significant at 5% 
 OSHIP Independent ownership (standardised value)                                                     * = Significant at 10% 
 AUDIT Audit quality (standardised value) 
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Table 4 
Comparison of corporate governance for disclosing and non-disclosing firms 
 
Year 2000 Strong Governance Weak Governance Total 
Discloser 64 38 102 
Non-discloser 46 52 98 
Total 110 90 200 
 X2= 3.849   
 p = 0.025 
(corrected for continuity) 
  
Year 2002 Strong Governance Weak Governance Total 
Discloser 50 53 103 
Non-discloser 44 36 80 
Total 94 89 183 
 X2= 0.751   
 p = 0.193 
(corrected for continuity) 
  
 
 
 42 
 
Table 5 
Year 2000: logistic models of decision to disclose forward-looking information 
 
 
Dependent variable =1, if a firm discloses forward-looking information in financial report  
                                =0, if a firm does not disclose forward-looking information in financial report  
 
FLI = α + β1BOARD + β2COMMEE + β3OSHIP + β4AUDIT + β5SIZE + β6PERFORM +  β7INFO + β8LEVG  + ε 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Wald Statistic Significance 
BOARD + 0.015  0.000 0.493 
COMMEE + 0.676 2.029 *0.077 
OSHIP + 0.046 0.007 0.468 
AUDIT + 1.715 4.051 **0.022 
SIZE + 0.238 1.177 0.139 
PERFORM ? -0.006 0.273 0.301 
INFO + 0.358 1.898 *0.084 
LEVG ? 0.774 1.248 0.132 
     
 Sample size n=200    
 Chi-squared statistic 19.445   
 Significance level 0.013   
 Nagelkerke R square 12.4%   
 
FLI = α   +   β1CG  +  β2SIZE + β3PERFORM +  β4INFO + β5LEVG + ε 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Wald Statistic Significance 
CG + 0.639 4.393 **0.018 
SIZE + 0.344 2.867 **0.045 
PERFORM ? -0.007 0.312 0.288 
INFO + 0.399 2.341 *0.063 
LEVG ? 0.742 1.174 0.139 
     
 Sample size n=200   
 Chi-squared statistic 15.531   
 Significance level 0.008   
 Nagelkerke R square 10%   
 
***, **, and * indicate one-tailed significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respectively 
 
Variable Definitions: 
FLI 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if forward-looking information disclosed in financial report 
BOARD Board autonomy (standardised value)                                  
COMMEE Presence and quality of board committees (standardised value) 
OSHIP Independent ownership (standardised value) 
AUDIT Audit quality (standardised value) 
CG Firm’s overall corporate governance score (standardised value) 
SIZE Firm size: Logarithm of sales (to base 10) 
PERFORM Firm performance: Return on assets 
INFO Information environment: Book to market  
LEVG Firm leverage: Debt to total assets 
 
 43 
 Table 6 
Year 2002: logistic models of decision to disclose forward-looking information 
 
 
Dependent variable =1, if a firm discloses forward-looking information in financial report  
                                =0, if a firm does not disclose forward-looking information in financial report  
 
FLI = α + β1BOARD + β2COMMEE + β3OSHIP + β4AUDIT + β5SIZE + β6PERFORM +  β7INFO + β8LEVG  + ε 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Wald Statistic Significance 
BOARD + 
-1.381 2.677 0.102 
COMMEE + 
-0.581 0.929 0.334 
OSHIP + 
-0.594 0.353 0.552 
AUDIT + 0.711 0.351 0.276 
SIZE + 0.132 0.275 0.300 
PERFORM ? 
-0.003 0.241 0.312 
INFO + 
-0.005 0.002 0.483 
LEVG ? 3.075 8.390 ***0.002 
     
 Sample size n=183    
 Chi-squared statistic 14.124   
 Significance level 0.079   
 Nagelkerke R square 10%   
 
FLI = α   +   β1CG  +  β2SIZE + β3PERFORM +  β4INFO + β5LEVG + ε 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Wald Statistic Significance 
CG + 
-0.485 1.822 0.176 
SIZE + 0.222 0.819 0.182 
PERFORM ? 
-0.004 0.353 0.276 
INFO + 0.006 0.002 0.481 
LEVG ? 2.739 7.130 ***0.004 
     
 Sample size n=183   
 Chi-squared statistic 11.138   
 Significance level 0.049   
 Nagelkerke R square 7.9%   
     
***, **, and * indicate one-tailed significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respectively 
 
Variable definitions: 
FLI 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if forward-looking information disclosed in financial report 
BOARD Board autonomy (standardised value)                                  
COMMEE Presence and quality of board committees (standardised value) 
OSHIP Independent ownership (standardised value) 
AUDIT Audit quality (standardised value) 
CG Firm’s overall corporate governance score (standardised value) 
SIZE Firm size: Logarithm of sales (to base 10) 
PERFORM Firm performance: Return on assets 
INFO Information environment: Book to market  
LEVG Firm leverage: Debt to total assets 
 
 
 
 
